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Abstract
We study hiring decisions made by competing universities in a dynamic framework, focusing
on the structure of university ﬁnance. Universities with annual state-approved ﬁnancing under-
invest in high-quality faculty, while universities that receive a signiﬁcant part of their annual
income from returns on endowments hire fewer but better faculty and provide long-term con-
tracts. If university ﬁnancing is linked to the number of students, there is additional pressure to
hire low-quality short-term staﬀ. An increase in the university’s budget might force the univer-
sity to switch its priorities from ‘research’ to ‘teaching’ in equilibrium. We employ our model to
discuss the necessity for state-ﬁnanced endowments, and investigate the political economics of
competition between universities, path-dependence in the development of the university system,
and higher-education reform in emerging market economies.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Worldwide, there is an enormous heterogeneity in the ways universities hire their faculty. While
as i g n i ﬁcant number of universities around the globe opt for the US-type system with a relatively
low teaching load and a tenure system, the majority of universities discount the research activities
of their faculty. In many countries, it was not until very recently that governments set themselves
the task of creating research universities (Altbach, 2007). However, such reforms require not only
suﬃcient resources, but also a clear understanding of the links between organizational structure
and incentives for conducting research activity. For example, the Chinese government has recently
unveiled a 15-year Medium to Long-Term Science and Technology Development Plan, which, among
other things, envisages a 90% increase of the share of GDP spent on R&D over the period. While
the plan has already succeeded in starting major modern research programs (Science, April 2006),
the fact that institutional arrangements do not allow for an inﬂow of money that would be outside
government control, e.g., by via endowing certain departments or programs, makes the whole plan
dependent upon the high growth rates of the Chinese economy.
Many studies in the literature have been devoted to the personal incentives for academicians
(e.g., Carmichael, 1988, Chatterjee and Marshall, 2001). However, with the notable exception
of Alchian (1959), these incentives are typically separated from the budgetary issues a modern
university faces. In this paper, we study the relationship between universities that are competing
for good students, and their professors using a dynamic framework. The way universities are
budgeted plays an important role: universities with annual state-approved ﬁnancing hire professors
short-term, while universities that receive a signiﬁcant part of their annual income from royalty
on their endowments provide faculty with tenure contracts. Budget uncertainties might stem from
rising costs; in 2006, Trinity College at Hartford, USA, had to lay-oﬀ more than 20 faculty members
as a result of a 62% rise in utility expenses and a 22% rise in health costs. As the price elasticity
of demand for education in any particular college is arguably high, private universities relying
primarily on tuition cannot maintain their faculty during low budget periods.
Rising costs are not the only source of budget uncertainty. While in the US the state ﬁnancing
of universities is a relatively stable source of income (though still more volatile than endowment
ﬁnancing, as many university budgets are subject to approval by state legislature on an annual
basis), in other countries the government might be the primary source of budget uncertainty. In
1995, the Japanese government — perhaps as a result of budget diﬃculties — initiated a large-scale
initiative to promote new hiring rules for foreign academics, and the standard term for a typical
2contract was one academic year. The fact that “few institutions except in the United States and
Japan have endowment funds that support research” (Altbach, 2007) makes the role of endowments
in the development of research universities a focal point for discussion, especially for countries with
governments that have only limited commitment power. Even in the US, budget shocks aﬀect the
every-day life of researchers. Termination of the Dallas Superconducting Super Collider project in
1993 resulted not only in a write-oﬀ of $2 billion, but also in an abrupt change in the lives of 1000+
research-related employees only.1
If university ﬁnancing is linked to the number of students (either directly through government
money, as is standard in developed European countries and US state universities, or indirectly
from graduates’ donations, as in private US universities), there is additional pressure to hire low-
quality short-term professors. Furthermore, budget uncertainty might force competing universities
to hire low-quality professors in a dynamic equilibrium even if a higher level of high-ability faculty
is optimal for any of the possible budget outcomes in the one-shot game. The primary source
of this dynamic ineﬃciency is the commitment problem (see e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001,
Acemoglu, 2008 for the modern perspective of the commitment problem). In a Markov perfect
equilibrium, budget uncertainty prevents universities from providing tenure; without providing
tenure to high-quality professors, universities cannot provide them with ﬁrst-best incentives.
There is an important caveat to our work: the economics of education is a topic which has often
been much too speciﬁc for comparative analysis. Most of the discussion on the subject is devoted
entirely to US-speciﬁc problems, while the most urgent problems outside the US are not addressed.
Our model is consistent with existing evidence on university structure in both the US and the
world in general, and also provides direct policy implications for university-building strategies in
developing countries such as China and Russia. For example, our model predicts that a private
university will be more likely to concentrate most of its resources in a few selected departments.
Nevertheless, even semantic diﬀerences can create diﬃculties. In France, the educational institu-
tions that correspond to what we call a ‘high-standard’ (research) university are called Ecoles as
opposed to Universities, with l’Ecole Normale and l’Ecole Polytechnique being the most prominent
examples.
In modelling the diﬀerent strategies that universities might pursue — either high-standard (“re-
search university”) or standard (“teaching university”)2 — we focus on the hiring decisions. Indeed,
1“10 years after SSC: Scientists Are Long Gone, But Bitter Memories Remain”, Science, October 2003, 302: 40-41.
2While the distinction between “teaching” and “research” universities is clear in the US and UK, it is much less
so in a larger context. In most countries, the terms “high-standard” and “standard” (“normal”) seem to be more
3faculty selection might be the most important way of controlling the standard of quality. For
example, the preamble to the “Principles Governing Research at Harvard” states: “The primary
means for controlling the quality of the scholarly activities of this Faculty is through the rigorous
academic standard applied in selecting its members.”
The diﬀerence in university funding across diﬀerent countries is huge. In Germany, less than
10% of total funding for university education is private (The Economist, September 25, 2004).
Recently, there have been several attempts to link strategies that universities pursue to funding
structure. Beath, Poyago-Theotoky, and Ulph (2005) attempt to assess the ways in which university
funding aﬀects the research vs. teaching trade-oﬀ. The budget constraint plays a crucial role in
their model. Criticizing an attempt by Del Rey (2001) to model static university competition, they
note that research quality need not be directly incorporated into a university budget constraint. In
contrast with our model, Beath et al (2005) address neither the competition between universities,
nor possible student heterogeneity. Thus, their main ﬁndings are dependent not upon the market
environment a university might operate in, but on the existence of a centralized system for funding
u n i v e r s i t i e s .I fq u a l i t yr e s e a r c hi st a r g e t e dt ob er ewarded, the result might be the “binary divide” of
universities into a small elite of “research universities”and a large group of “teaching universities”
(pre-1992 UK is cited as a classic example). Our model highlights, in particular, the role of
commitment by the central authority to provide funding. Vanhaeht and Pauwels (2005) model
universities competing for heterogenous students; the university budgets are state-ﬁnanced and
include a ﬁxed sum and a per-student allowance. One result is the existence of an asymmetric
equilibrium, with only one university pursuing a high-standard. We extend this result to a dynamic
environment: a higher budget volatility hurts the “upper end” of the binary divide.
One important instance of the US perspective being diﬀerent from that of the rest of the world
is the tenure issue. There are two classic economic explanations for why universities may opt for
the tenure system (see, e.g. Morton and Shapiro, 1999, for a survey; also, Finkin, 1996, Menard,
1996, Benjamin and Wagner, 1994). First, it provides young faculty with an incentive to pursue
their ﬁrst-best eﬀorts (Holmstrom, 1982), while for risk-neutral universities this is an eﬃcient way
to pay highly risk-averse academics. Second, a tenure system provides good incentives for senior
(tenured) faculty to hire the best of young scholars as the already-tenured faculty do not feel
competitive pressure from their younger colleagues (Carmichael, 1988). Waldman (1990) argue
that if young faculty have no tenure prospects, then they will have inferior incentives to invest in
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Figure 1: Percentage of faculty on tenure line and annual donations per employee for private
universities in US top-50.
1977). In our model, the returns to a research project are delayed, as we focus on dynamic issues;
incorporating uncertainty about the outcome of a research project here is straightforward. Finally,
the variance of unobserved productivity parameters of a university professor over time might make
tenure an optimal arrangement (Siow, 1998). In emerging countries such as China, India, Brazil, or
Russia, the tenure system that assumes competitive pay for faculty is largely absent. (Nevertheless,
a typical professor in a Brazilian public university has life-long employment, Schwartzman, 2007.).
We do not attempt to oﬀer a new explanation of why tenure is important: here, our analysis is
based on the premise that long-term contracts are beneﬁcial.3
While the governments of developing nations pay increasing attention to endowment-type ﬁ-
nancing of research universities and to the tenure-based faculty system, US universities are moving
in another direction. Shuster and Finkelstein (American Faculty, 2006) write, “...the transformation
is remarkable: from 1969 to 1998, a decline by one-half in faculty members occupying tenure-eligible
positions and sevenfold increase in faculty reporting non-tenure-eligible appointments.” (Barnes and
O’Hara, 1999, observe the same trend in UK universities). On November 20, 2007, The New York
Times reported that the American Federation of Teachers estimate that nearly 70% of US profes-
3As we focus exclusively on (dis)incentives provided by budget uncertainty, we do not survey relevant contract
theory literature (see e.g., Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005 for a general survey; and Chatterjee and Marshal for
contract theory issues related to academic research). The paper by Guriev and Kvasov (2004) is especially relevant
as it explicitly studies negotiation over the contract expiration time.
5sors are “adjuncts”, i.e. either part-timers or full-timers not on a tenure-track, the primary reason
for this being an insuﬃcient amount of stable funds. In universities, the share of faculty that were
not eligible for tenure rose from 3.4% to 16.4%. Masten (2006) cites a study of the tenure-granting
process in the US in the 1970s: the process was fully faculty-managed in 5.8% of universities,
while in 29.9% it was jointly managed by faculty and administration. The same study showed
that the administration-managed tenure-granting process was more typical for state universities,
rather than for private ones. This supports one of the predictions of our model: universities with
annually-approved budgets retain more administrative control over hiring decisions.
In a largely overlooked paper, Armen Alchian wrote, “The reason for the general acceptance
of tenure is not that the search for truth has some special characteristics which distinguish it from
other products, but that, instead, its acceptance springs from the special ownership arrangement
and ﬁnancial structure of our colleges” (Alchian, 1959: page 179). Alchian (1959) predicts that
the proportion of tenured faculty is positively correlated with the share of the annual budget from
endowment proceeds. (Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the percentage of faculty on
tenure track and annual donations per employee for private universities in the top-50 US universi-
ties.) Another prediction is that a commercial university, which is a residual claimant of employees’
eﬀorts, is expected to use tenure contracts less often. Our model is the simplest possible way to
assess these issues in a dynamic perspective. Basing his observations on empirical data from the
academic labor market, Ehrenberg (2003) notes, “A major reason for the growing use of part-time
and non-tenure-track faculty is that the ability of a large fraction of American higher education
institutions to generate the revenues necessary to pay for higher salaries for tenure track faculty
is greatly limited.” While certainly plausible, this explanation runs somewhat contrary to the fact
that the budgets of most universities in per student terms has been increasing over time.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model, and Section 3 contains
its analysis. In Section 4, we discuss the policy implications of the formal model, drawing examples
from the recent experience of emerging research universities. Section 5 concludes.
2S e t u p
There are two inﬁnitely-lived universities who hire professors with heterogenous ability, and het-
erogenous students who choose a university for their studies.
6Faculty and Students
There are two types of professors, able θ = θH and mediocre θ = θL. This parameter captures
both the personal endowment of human capital, i.e. the ability of a professor to teach or do joint
research with students,4 and his outside option. That is, a university needs to pay a professor of
type θ at least w(θ)=θ. In total, there are nH able and nL mediocre professors in the university.
Each professor needs to apply costly eﬀorts to be productive; for simplicity, we assume that the
cost of eﬀorts is small, i.e. the professor does not apply any eﬀort if she is indiﬀerent.
Students have heterogeneous abilities as well: they can also be either able or mediocre, s ∈
{sH,s L}. A student who has ability s, if matched with a professor of ability θ, gets from this
matching sθ. However, a student cannot tell one from the other ex-ante.
Suppose that a student meets m professors during her studies. The number of able professors a
student i meets, mi, is random; the distribution of mi is hypergeometric with parameters (m,nH +









To graduate from university, a student needs to exert costly eﬀo r t s ;w ea s s u m et h a tcH =0 ,
while cL > 0. Each student i chooses a university to maximize her expected skills minus this cost:
Eui(s) − ci.
Universities
Each period, a university has to allocate a budget B to hire a mix of two types of professors,
(nH,n L). The balance condition is B = nHwH + nLwL, where w(θ) is the salary of a professor of
type θ.
Let MH denote the number of high-ability students, and ML be the number of normal-abilty







+ µ(MH + ML).
4Glaeser (2002) observes, “In 1900, students didn’t care whether or not faculty members were researchers. In
2000, they do.”
5If a random variable X has a hypergeometric distrubution with parameters (a,b,c), then the probability of getting









6For a random variable X that has a hypergeometric distrubution with parameters (a,b,c),E X=
ac
b .
7The ﬁrst and the second terms give the expected output given the composition of faculty and
students, and the third term reﬂects the fact that the university’s budget depends on the size of
the student body. If θ is the outside option for a professor of type θ, the balance condition is
B = nHθH + nLθL.
There are two assumptions worth discussing. First, we assume that the professor-student ratio
is ﬁxed; MH + ML = λ(nH + nL). Though this assumption might seem overly rigid — especially
for private US universities, which operate under no formal pressure to maintain a ﬁxed ratio — it
might be derived from ﬁrst principles, if professors have a quasi-linear utility function of the form
u(w,t)=w − ρd(t), where w = w(t) is the optimal compensation for t hours of teaching (Tirole,
1988). Second, an interesting extension would be to analyze the case of universities competing for
star professors, i.e. allow the wage of high-ability professors, w = w(θH), to be determined by the
market.
In each period t, the budget of each university Bi = Bt,i=1 ,2,i se q u a lt oBB with probability
p, and to BS with probability q =1− p, BB >B S. If a university wants to ﬁre some professors in
period t, it has bear a cost. The cost of ﬁring a mediocre professor is normalized to zero: one can
think of these professors as having year-long contracts. Firing an able professor costs the university
C>0. This is probably the most natural way to model tenure: the higher the cost C, the more
secure the professor’s position.
We shall start with analyzing the stage game of our dynamic setup as a static game. In the
dynamic game, we assume that a professor enjoys the return on her research eﬀorts only if she
remains as faculty in the next period. For students, we assume that their studies take more than
one period, but they make their decision only once.
Timing of the stage game in the dynamic game
1. Universities simultaneously and independently learn and allocate their budgets, and make
hiring/ﬁring decisions.
2. Payoﬀs from the research eﬀorts of the faculty who remained are received.
3. New students enter the university of their choice, if there is enough capacity.
4. Students are matched to professors, and one-period payoﬀs are received. The period ends.
We focus on symmetric Markov perfect equilibria (Maskin and Tirole, 2001). To simplify
matters, we assume that able students make their choice before the rest of the students: this
8corresponds to entrance exams, which is practiced, e.g., in all Russian universities. In France,
high-standard Ecoles have entrance exams, while other (standard) universities have virtually free
admission. Also, we assume that students’ strategies are stationary: there is a ﬁxed percentage of
students that enter universities to spend a number of years there.
3A n a l y s i s
3.1 Static Analysis
We start with the analysis of a one-shot game between universities, which will serve as our basis for
the dynamic model. In the static game, universities start by simultaneously and independently al-
locating their budgets on either high-ability or mediocre faculty. Students then enter the university
of their choice, and faculty members exert their ﬁrst-best eﬀorts.7 Finally, students are randomly
matched to professors, and payoﬀs are received.
First, we observe that in equilibrium able students would always prefer to go to the university







+ µ(MH + ML).
Given the budget, the total number of professors, n = nH +nL, satisﬁes B
θH ≤ n ≤ B
θL. Substituting
nL for nH from the budget constraint, we obtain U as a convex function of nH. Thus, U is maximized
when either nH = B















L is the respective number of high- and low-ability students if the university
choose the normal strategy, and Ma
H and Ma
L is the respective number of high- and low-ability
students if the university choose the high-standard strategy, the university spends its budget on
high-ability professors. Otherwise, nH =0 .
Without loss of generality, we shall assume that sL =0 .8
Let T be the total number of all able students, and let TH be the minimum number of able
students that would induce a university to pursue a high-standard strategy, given that the other uni-
7In a one-period game faculty have no incentives to vary eﬀort depending on the prospects of retaining their
position; thus, we simply ﬁxt h el e v e lo fe ﬀorts.
8This is without loss of generality, since the university maximand includes the size of the student body; thus, it
is sH − sL that matters and sL can be normalized to zero.
9versity is also pursuing a high-standard strategy (if the other university pursues a normal strategy,













Now, let TL be the maximum number of able students that induce a university to pursue a normal














The following Proposition summarizes the above discussion.
Proposition 1 (i) Suppose that T>2TH. For any pair (T1,T 2) such that T = T1 + T2 and








students enter university i, i =1 ,2.
(ii) If T<2TH, there cannot be more that one high-standard university in equilibrium.
(iii) Suppose that TL <T .For any pair (T1,T 2) such that T = T1 + T2 and Ti ≥ TL for some



















high-ability students enter university i, while the rest of the high-ability
students enter −i. If both universities choose a normal strategy, Ti students enter university i.
For the sake of clarity, this proposition does not include students’ equilibrium responses to
oﬀ-equilibrium-path strategies of universities. For example, (i) requires the speciﬁcation that if
the universities’ strategies diﬀer, then all able students enter the high-standard university; if both
universities opt for a normal-standard strategy, then any decision the able students make is a
best response. Similarly, (iii) requires the speciﬁcation of what students do if universities choose a
diﬀerent strategy proﬁle. If only one of the two conditions S1 ≥ TH and S2 ≥ T,w h e r eT = S1+S2,
is fulﬁlled, then S1 students opt for university 1, while S2 students opt for university 2, provided
that both universities are high-standard.
Budget
Initially, we assumed that the two universities have equal budgets. Now we relax this assumption.
Let Bi be the budget available for university i. We focus on the most interesting case, when there is
only one high-standard university. Thus, there is no competition for able students: T > λB1
θH,T>
TL. Fix a pair (T1,T 2) such that T = T1+T2 and without loss of generality assume that T1 ≥ TL. By















. As above, we do not explicitly specify equilibrium responses for oﬀ-equilibrium
moves.
























H are the number of able students who enter university 1, depending on whether
it is high-standard or normal, respectively. Since students care only about the quality of faculty,
but not the university budget per se, an increase in B1 does not aﬀect students’ choice if condition
(1) is satisﬁed. When (1) fails, the high standard is no longer the equilibrium choice of university








We shall demonstrate that there exists a certain threshold B1 such that (1) is satisﬁed










HθL), since the right-hand side of (1) depends on the equilibrium








B1, since θH >θ L,
f(B1) decreases with B1. Recall that the number of able students that enter university 1 when it
pursues a high-standard strategy, Mm
H, does not change with B1.
For B1 ≤ T
λθH, the number of able students who enter university 1 when the latter
pursues a normal-standard strategy is Ma
H = λB1














B1, which is linear in B1.F o r B1 > T
λθH,M a
H = T,







B1, which is also linear in B1, and decreasing with
B1.
In sum, f(B1) is piecewise-linear in B1,f (0) > 0 and f(B1) is decreasing when B1 > T
λθH.
This completes the proof of the following Proposition.
Proposition 2 Suppose that T > λB1
θH,T>TL, and ﬁxap a i r(T1,T 2) such that T = T1 + T2,






























The most striking implication of Proposition 2 is that an increase in a university’s budget
might actually force it to abandon the high standard. The intuition is that when the student
quality becomes a binding constraint, the university cannot gain by attracting able students and
concentrates on increasing the overall number of students. This can be most easily achieved by
11hiring relatively cheap, mediocre faculty. The comparative statics are again natural: an increase
in the price of high-quality faculty, or, alternatively, an increase in the diﬀerence in the quality of
faculty shift the threshold B1 down; that is, such changes make normal-quality faculty the most
preferred choice of the university for a wider range of parameters. One example might be illustrative.
In the US, recent diﬃculties with academic standard (the government-measured graduation rates
are 16 percent, which is bleak compared to the national average of 55) drew attention to the
University of Phoenix, a huge for-proﬁt university with 300,000 students on campuses in 39 states
and online, with 95 percent of faculty working part-time (compared with an average of 47 percent
nation-wide).9 While the common explanation for the reported erosion in quality of faculty is
rising market pressure, the increasing availability of federal funds might be another explanation.
The University of Phoenix gets more than any other university in federal student ﬁnancial aid; in
the 2004-05 academic year alone, it received 1.8 billion dollars in such aid.
There are some other practical implications of Proposition 2. Of course, this argument does not
necessarily imply that there might not exist a large state-ﬁnanced university with excellent faculty.
However, the argument implies that a good department needs to have special arrangements within
the university. A real university, top-tier and low-tier alike, typically has more than one department
teaching essentially the same subject. For example, Harvard has the Department of Government
and the Kennedy School of Government (KSG), two completely separate entities with overlapping
curricula and the research agenda. There are alsoa tl e a s tt h r e ed i s t i n c tw a y st oe a r naP h . D .
in economics at Harvard: at the Economics Department, KSG, and the Harvard Business School.
In Erasmus University of Rotterdam, there are several ways to get a (largely the same) degree in
business or ﬁnancial administration: at the Economics D e p a r t m e n t ,a n di nt h eS c h o o lo fB u s i n e s s .
Proposition 2 suggests a rationale for why a university may chose to have two departments, a high-
standard and a normal one. Suppose that when the budget is equal to some B>0, the university
prefers to maintain high standard, and let B0 >Bbe large enough so that the university prefers
normal standard when the budget is B0. Then the university is better oﬀ splitting its program
into departments with budgets B (high-standard) and B00 = B0 − B (normal), rather than staying



















9“Troubles Grow for a University Built on Proﬁts”, New York Times, February 11, 2007. Ruch (2001) “identiﬁes
10 distinctions between private for-proﬁt and non-proﬁt higher education institutions including, most importantly,
the fact that private institutions are tax paying rather than tax exempt, have investors versus donors, and have
private investment capital instead of endowment.”



































The same argument demonstrates that there might be more than one high-standard department
inside one big university.
Peter Howitt, discussing the economics of science and the future of universities (Howitt, 2003),
attributed the recent breakthroughs in information and biological technology to a large extent to the
ability of American universities to form computer science and chemical engineering departments
well before any European university. Our model highlights the pressure that per-student state
ﬁnancing puts on universities to switch to a predominantly teaching mode, rather than to open a
new high-quality research department.
Student-teacher ratio, funding, etc
A decrease in the student-teacher ratio makes high standard more likely. Indeed, ﬁxa l lt h ep a -
rameters of the model, except λ, the student-teacher ratio.10 The number of professors a student




+ µλ(nH + nL)
Proposition 3 (i) Suppose that λ1 <λ 2. For any equilibrium in the game Γ(B,m,µ,θL,θH,λ 2)
with at least one university pursuing a high-standard strategy, there exists an equilibrium in the
game Γ(B,m,µ,θL,θH,λ 1) where the universities pursue the same strategies.
( i i )F o ra n ys e to fp a r a m e t e r s(B,m,µ,θL,θH,λ) such that there exists an equilibrium with at
least one high-standard university, there exist thresholds λK <λ N such that for any λ>λ K,a n y
equilibrium of Γ(B,m,µ,θL,θH,λ) has less universities with high-standard strategies, and for any
λ>λ N,t h eg a m eΓ(B,m,µ,θL,θH,µ,λ) has no equilibria with high-standard universities.
Now ﬁx all the parameters but µ, the amount of funding associated with each student.
10Throughout the comparative statics analysis, we assume that the strategies of high-quality students are ﬁxed.
13Proposition 4 (i) Suppose that µ1 <µ 2. For any equilibrium in the game Γ(B,m,µ2,θL,θH,λ)
with at least one university pursuing a high-standard strategy, there exists an equilibrium in the
game Γ(B,m,µ1,θL,θH,λ) where the universities pursue the same strategies.
( i i )F o ra n ys e to fp a r a m e t e r s(B,m,µ,θL,θH,λ) such that there exists an equilibrium with at
least one high-standard university, there exist thresholds µK <µ N such that for any µ>µ K,a n y
equilibrium of Γ(B,m,µ,θL,θH,λ) has less universities pursuing high-standard strategies, and for
any µ>µ N,t h eg a m eΓ(B,m,µ,θL,θH,λ) has no equilibria with high-standard universities.
Similar comparative statics results may be obtained for m, the number of professors a student
expects to meet during the time she spends in the university. Along with the proportion of the
high-quality professors and their professional quality θH,mis a proxy for the overall quality of
the university. With either m or θH increasing, the range of parameters for which high-standard
equilibria exist increases. This highlights an important policy trade-oﬀ that the governments of
developing countries face: easing access to university for students (e.g., by making any public
university tuition-free as it was via a constitutional provision in Brazil in 1988, Schwartzman,
2007) increases the pressure on the university to pursue a normal-quality strategy.
3.2 Dynamics
We now apply our model to the main issue: the dynamic eﬀects of budget uncertainty on the nature
of faculty contracts. Suppose that the budget of each university, Bi,m a yh a v eo n eo ft w ov a l u e s ,
Bi ∈ {BB,B S}, with BB >B S. We focus on the case in which the total number of able students
does not exceed the maximum number of students that a high-standard university with budget
BH can admit, λBS
θH < 1
2T<λ BH
θH , but is larger than the number of able students needed for a
normal university. (Other cases may be analyzed in a similar way.) If both universities are of high
standard, able students split equally. Furthermore, we assume that university budgets are perfectly
correlated: for the state-funded universities, this might be the result of an adverse macroeconomic
shock. For both public and private universities, a common budget shock might follow an economy-
wide recession. When B1 = B2 = BB, both universities choose the high-standard equilibrium.
Recall that in each period t, Bt = B1 = B2 is equal to BB with probability p, and to BS with
probability q =1− p;t h ec o s to fﬁring a mediocre professor is normalized to zero, while ﬁring an
able professor costs the university C>0.
Informally, the strategy of university i determines the number of able professors that the uni-
versity hires in period t as a function of Bt, the budget for period t, and the existing composition
14of faculty. (We relegate all formal details, including a description of histories of the game, and
strategies conditioned upon histories, to the Appendix. Herein, we omit the time subscript when-

















θL , is spent on professors




























H∗ is the number of professors who already have tenure in period t.T h e n u m b e r o f















The ﬁrst observation is that if research eﬀorts pay oﬀ with a one-period delay, no able professor
will exert any eﬀorts until she expects to retain her position in the next period.



























































where T∗ is the number of able students. T∗ = T if the budget is large, and T∗ =2 BS







































































































We focus on symmetric Markov perfect equilibria, so that universities make the same







U (nH (B,nH∗)) = U0 (B,nH∗)+
δ
1 − δ
[pU (nH (BB,n H (B,nH∗))) + qU (nH (BS,n H (B,nH∗)))].
(2)
15This is a standard Bellman-type equation used for solving Markov games. Essentially, (2) is a
system of non-linear equations which, under fairly mild restrictions on parameters, has a unique
symmetric solution.
Budget Uncertainty and Tenure Contracts
Our next goal is to study the conditions that determine the equilibrium choice of faculty by the
university. For the sake of simplicity, we make no distinction between tenure and long-term contract:
at the cost of additional technicalities the model might be modiﬁed to deal with ﬁxed-length long-
term contracts.
Lemma 1 There exists some C0 = C0(BB,B S) such that if the cost of ﬁring a tenured professor,
C, exceeds C0, then a university does not spend its entire budget BB on high-quality professors.
Proof. With probability q, the next-period budget is normal, B = BS. Thus, the university will be
forced to default on obligations to (some) of its tenured professors. When C is suﬃciently high, the
university prefers not to hire those whom they would not be able to aﬀord with the low budget.¥
Now assume that C ≥ C0, and thus no tenured professor is ﬁr e di ne q u i l i b r i u m .I nt h i ss i t u a t i o n ,
universities hire either a minimal, or maximum number of high-ability professors. The intuition
is that the budget uncertainty presents a disincentive for faculty to pursue research eﬀorts, thus
forcing universities to put more emphasis on less expensive low-quality faculty. Thus, a decrease
in ﬁring costs help to hire high-quality professors, but does not help in providing them with the
proper incentives.
We shall start with some less-interesting cases, when one strategy is preferred under all cir-





>U 0 (BB,0). In this case, in both good and bad
times, a high-standard strategy is preferred to a normal strategy given that the other university





>U 0 (BB,0).I n t h i s c a s e ,
the bad-times budget is spent on high-quality faculty no matter whether the other university is
high-standard or normal.





<U 0 (BB,0). Given that the other university
pursues a normal-standard strategy, a university prefers to spend its entire good-times budget on
normal-quality faculty rather than to hire as much high-quality faculty as the low budget would
allow. If at the same time













16there will be no high-quality professors hired in equilibrium.
Suppose that in a one-period game with a small budget, the sub-game perfect equilibrium is
such that able professors are not hired. Then hiring mediocre faculty is a dominant strategy in any
state of nature of the Markov game. Thus, it is plausible to concentrate on the situation when the
one-period equilibrium strategy given a small budget involves the hiring of able professors.
Proposition 5 Suppose that a university prefers to have as many able professors when the budget





















Then there exists a unique Markov-perfect equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the whole small budget
is spent on able professors.
While condition (3) can be used to conduct extensive comparative static analysis, which we
leave for the next section, the analysis can be reﬁn e de v e nf u r t h e r .








































































































First, suppose that the other university is of high standard. Then U1
aa is the utility a university
derives from employing the maximum feasible (i.e., compatible with the small budget) number
of able professors in good times, U2
aa is the utility a university derives from employing the same
17number of able professors in bad times, U1
ma is the utility of spending the whole budget on mediocre
faculty in good times, and U2
ma is the utility of spending the whole budget on mediocre faculty
in bad times. Now, suppose that the other university is normal. Then U1
am is the utility of the
high-standard university in good times, U2
am is the utility of the high—standard university in bad
times, U1
mm is the utility of the normal university in good times, and U2
mm is the utility of the
normal university in bad times.




















The analysis of the one-shot game demonstrated that if this condition is fulﬁlled, than this university
prefers to be of high standard in bad times as well. Re-writing this inequality (see the Appendix)
yields the existence condition for a symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium with both universities






























Now, suppose that hiring mediocre faculty is preferred, from the one-period perspective, in good
times: U1
am <U 1
mm. Furthermore, suppose that the long-term prospects of hiring mediocrities in




















Again, the static analysis implies that the bad-times condition yields the corresponding condition
for good times. After a series of transformations (which are relegated to the Appendix), we ﬁnd the




























(1 − pδ)+ θL
θH
³
(1 − 2pδ) − B2










In this equilibrium, there is no room for research.
For a range of parameters, the uncertainty of the budget forces universities to hire normal-
quality professors in a dynamic equilibrium, even if a higher level of high-ability faculty is optimal
for any possible budget. This happens because an increase in the university budget leads to a
switch in the optimal mode of operation from a high-standard small university to a normal large
18university. This eﬀect is especially strong if the university cannot spend more than the low-budget
allowance on high-quality professors as ﬁring costs are high. However, if the diﬀerence in utility
between high- and normal-standard is relatively small, the university pursues a normal-standard



























The following Proposition summarizes the above discussion.
Proposition 6 (i) Suppose that the parameters of the model satisfy condition (6). Then there will
be no high-quality tenured professors in any symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium.
(ii) The range of parameters for which there is no dynamic equilibrium with tenure, i.e., for
which condition (6) is satisﬁed, is larger when the quality of able students, sH, is low, the professor-
student ratio, λ, is low, the size of bad-times (good-times, resp.) budget, B2 (B1, resp.) is low (high,
r e s p . ) ,a n dt h ea m o u n to fm o n e yp e rs t u d e n t ,µ, is low.
(iii) When both conditions (5) and (6) are satisﬁed, though a high-standard policy may be pur-
sued in a one-period game, there is no dynamic (Markov perfect) equilibrium in which universities
would pursue high standard.
A formal proof is relegated to the Appendix. The intuition for (iii) is as follows. When the
university’s budget rises, the diﬀerence in utility for high standard and normal standard decreases.
Suppose that this diﬀerence, d, is small. If the university cannot hire enough high-standard faculty
in good times as the cost of ﬁring them in bad times is prohibitive, a normal-standard university
would be better. When the bad-times diﬀerence in utility between high-standard and normal
universities exceeds d, there is no reason to hire an able professor for a tenure position in any state
of the world.
4 Discussion
The Dynamic Eﬀect of Budget Uncertainty
While the advantages of having an endowment are taken for granted by US university administra-
tors, it is a point of contention outside the US (e.g., in discussing strategies for building world-
class universities in India, Indiresan (2007) argues against endowment money for universities). In
economies with a large state sector, politicians and government bureaucrats are hostile to the idea
of granting government money as an endowment, as this would strip them of control over these
19funds. Our argument emphasizes what is lost when both faculty and university administrators
have to operate on an annual budget. If it is possible to operate on annual budget ﬁnancing in the
social sciences and mathematics, the situation is diﬀerent in areas such as experimental physics,
chemical engineering, and biology, where the success of many research projects is conditional upon
the ability of the university to make long-term ﬁnancial commitments.
Formally, we deﬁne the index of budget volatility as follows:
ω = ω(BH,B L)=( BH − BL)p.
Since a proper measure of budget volatility needs to reﬂect both the diﬀerence in absolute values
between budgets in good and bad times, and the probability with which the corresponding budgets
occur, taking the standard variance as a measure of volatility is inappropriate. Now, when ω is
small, the discrepancy between one-shot game equilibrium strategies and one-period strategies in
a dynamic equilibrium is small, while larger values of ω correspond to larger volatility.
Proposition 7 (i) For any discount rate δ>0, there exists ω0 such that for any ω<ω 0, the unique
equilibrium in the Markovian game is determined by the one-shot game with the small budget.
(ii) The higher the budget volatility ω, the smaller the range of parameters for which there exists
a symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium with some tenured faculty.
Ehrenberg (2003) reports a growing discrepancy in average faculty salary depending upon the
size of endowment in both private and public universities, and attributes this to a higher rate of
return on endowments, and not on tuition. However, this argument alone, even if coupled with
the plausible assumption that the majority of universities do not generate revenues to pay higher
salaries, cannot explain why these universities would opt for teaching-only faculty, rather than
a mix of able and mediocre faculty members. Our model is consistent with Ehrenberg’s (2003)
ﬁndings; it demonstrates how the desire to enroll more students forces a university to have no
high-ability professors. These ﬁndings are also consistent with our results on the impact of budget
uncertainty: it might not be the lack of money per se, but the expectations of a possibly low budget
in some period in the future. In fact, the very idea of a university, department, or chair ﬁnanced
by the annual royalty from a safe endowment was initially aimed at eliminating any uncertainty
related to various sources of ﬁnancing. Alchian (1959) speciﬁcally makes this point in a discussion
of institutional arrangements in universities. Altbach (2007) observes: “ﬂuctuating budgets can
damage [the newly emerging research] institutions.”
Still, there is no doubt that the sheer amount of resources available for a not-for-proﬁt organiza-
tion matters signiﬁcantly. Glaeser (2002) writes: “Of course, the other ingredient that made tenure
20possible was growing university resources,”and then quotes from Metzger, who writes, “...helped
by enormous largesse from the states, steep rises in federal support, the seed millions of the Ford
Foundation, the success of innumerable alumni fund drives, and public willingness to pay the tu-
itionandothercollegeattendancecosts...thefortunesofjudicialtenurerodehigh[].”Thismakes
the governments concerned with the quality of their universities willing to allocate substantial
amounts of money to targeted universities. However, they are typically unwilling to provide money
as endowments as this strips them of control. Another problem is that state involvement and low
inequality crowd out potential donors of university endowments. So, paradoxically, the successful
development of a research university in an emerging economy might be more probable in a country
where the government has a tight budget constraint, rather than in, e.g., oil-exporters such as
Saudi Arabia or Russia. Indeed, an important example of a successful university in an environment
that has known no such institutions is the private Bilkent University (the name is an acronym for
the “city of science and knowledge” in Turkish). Founded in 1984, it is now the highest ranking
Turkish university, both in terms of teaching and research. The crucial feature of this university’s
development was a development strategy built around the expansion of the initial endowment. The
creation of Bilkent University was then followed by the creation of Koc University and Sabanchi
University, which are pursuing similar development strategies.
The Political Economy of Higher Education
Our model highlights the implications of university competition when there is a scarcity of talented
students. One result is that the equilibrium allocation of students has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
relative returns of pursuing either a high-standard or normal strategy for a university. Thus, the
emergence of a high-standard private university puts pressure on large state universities. The New
York Times, reporting on the development of Turkish private universities, observes that “admin-
istrators at some public universities see the upstarts, with their big budgets and the ﬂexibility to
shift spending in response to the education market, as a threat.” The public bureaucracy response
included a number of restrictions that were eﬀectively aimed at compromising the competitive
advantages of the emerging institutions.
The problem with the equilibrium entrapment is not unique for developing nations. Altbach
(2007) asserts that “Germany, for example, considers all of its universities as research institutions,
and as a result is unable to provide adequate funding to any of them, although a few German
universities have been recognized for their research quality and are being given enhanced funding
to compete globally.” This calls for “a diﬀerentiated system [that] has academic institutions with
21diverse missions, structures and patterns of funding.”
However, as Proposition 2 demonstrates, focusing entirely on the government budget constraint
might be highly misleading. Altbach (2007) notes that “many countries have just one or two
research universities because of their cost and the resources available. Even in fairly large countries,
the number of research universities is often small; the United Kingdom has perhaps 20 institutions
and Japan has a similar number. China is aiming to establish well over 20, and Brazil has ﬁve. Some
countries may have more research universities than they can aﬀord; Sweden and the Netherlands are
examples.” Thus, discussion typically focuses on the lack of means rather on the institutions that
facilitate the development of research universities. However, Proposition 2 shows that an increase in
the budget available to the university depresses the relative beneﬁts of the high-standard strategy.
Path-dependence in University Development
Combining the main insights from the static case (Proposition 1) and the dynamic analysis (Propo-
sition 6) helps achieve an understanding of the path-dependence in the development of a university.
A university that starts as a ‘teaching university’ with a large number of students and no research-
oriented faculty is unlikely to switch to the “research mode” if its expansion depends on the increase
of the number of students, as is the case for many government-ﬁnanced programs. Similarly, a uni-
versity that starts as a small research-oriented unit is likely to expand and retain its orientation.
The following pair of examples–two institutions created from scratch in 1992–illustrates the point.
After decades of virtual non-existence of modern economic research and education under the
communist regime,11 two new institutions were founded in 1992. In 1992, the private New Economic
School, a two-year MA program, accepted its ﬁrst students; the State University–Higher School
of Economics started up a year later, in the fall of 1993. By 2007, both schools claimed major
successes, oﬀering undisputed top programs in economics (NES as an MA-granting program, HSE
as a BA-granting program). However, the paths of institutional development were drastically
diﬀerent. In the New Economic School, up to 90% of the economics curricula was primarily taught
by visitors from top Western economics departments for the ﬁrst seven years, 1992-1999. In 1999,
the ﬁrst Assistant Professor was hired for a tenure-track position, followed by one more in 2000
and two in 2001. By 2007, three of them have been promoted to tenure (in addition to two
“founding fathers” who got the position from the start), and there are 10 tenure-track Assistant
11Mathematical economics was an internationally competitive branch of Soviet economics, which boasts one Nobel
prize winner and several fellows of the Econometric Society. However, in the Soviet academic realm it was more a
part of mathematics than a social science. (See Alexeev, Gaddy, and Leitzel, 1992, for details.)
22Professors. The number of graduates increased from 30 in 1992 to 70 in 2007; the annual cost of
education per student is $16,000. By (admittedly raw) RePEC publication and citation rankings,
the New Economic School is among the 200 top economics departments in Europe (no other Russian
department is in the top 500), and among the top 5 in Eastern Europe.
In contrast, the Higher School of Economics, a state university relying heavily on government
support from its inception (initital funds were provided in part by the European Union), started
with less than 1,000 students in 1993 and now has more than 10,000. In 2006, HSE employed
more than 400 faculty members with Ph.D.s or equivalent (with 300 more such faculty members
working part-time). In perfect accordance with the predictions of our model (see Proposition 2
and the following formal discussion of incentives to create additional departments or “centers of
excellence”), instead of increasing overall standard, the Higher School of Economics has initiated the
formation of several internal institutions aimed at improving its world-wide research standing. One
of these, ICEF, hired its ﬁrst tenure-track Assistant Professor in 2005, and one other institution,
the Center for Advanced Studies, plans to start hiring in 2008.
5C o n c l u s i o n
We consider a university’s development strategy in a dynamic competitive environment. Universi-
ties choose whether or not to hire high-quality, expensive professors in order to attract able students;
pursuing a low-standard strategy results in a large “teaching university”. In the static environ-
ment, a surprising result is that with a ﬁxed teacher-student ratio, an increase in the budget of a
university might result in switching from a high-standard to a low-standard strategy. In a dynamic
environment, in the presence of budget uncertainty, universities might prefer to hire inexpensive,
mediocre professors in the short-term even if they would have hired high-quality professors in either
states of the world.
Using the theoretical model, we derive a number of policy implications for governments outside
the US. First, the allocation of large sums of money is not enough to provide a solid foundation for
the emergence of world-class research universities. The crucial element of a successful structuring
of incentives is long-term commitment. Second, the amount of money provided for day-to-day
university operations should be separated from the size of the student body. Controlling for the
size of the student/teacher ratio also makes hiring high-quality faculty a more attractive strategy
for a university.
The results of our formal analysis rest upon certain technical assumptions. In particular, the
23whole equilibrium analysis rests upon the ability of universities to screen, maybe non-perfectly,
the students’ quality. Relaxing this assumption has straightforward implications: the pressure on
universities to pursue a low-standard, large-university strategy will be higher. In the dynamic
game, we assumed a perfect correlation between the budgets of two competing universities. This
is plausible since a signiﬁcant part of university endowments is in the form of low-risk investments,
with returns often co-moving with the markets; the amount of new donations is also typically related
to macroeconomic shocks. Though we do not expect that a relaxation of this assumption would
signiﬁcantly alter the qualitative results of the analysis, it would require a substantial increase in
the complexity of the model, and is left for future research.
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